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Charles	  S.	  Peirce’s	  conception	  of	  inquiry	  is	  both	  a	  challenging	  and	  an	  easy	  topic	  to	  analyze	  from	  an	  
educational	  perspective.	  During	  his	  long	  life	  Peirce	  developed	  various	  conceptions	  concerning	  
signs,	  reasoning,	  logic,	  and	  inquiry.	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  and	  semiotic	  system	  provide	  a	  multitude	  of	  
overlapping	  illustrations	  for	  processes	  of	  inquiry.	  He	  wrote	  surprisingly	  little	  explicitly	  on	  
education.	  He	  had,	  however,	  famous	  dictums	  on	  learning	  and	  inquiry,	  emphasizing	  their	  
importance	  for	  the	  epistemology.	  According	  to	  his	  “first	  rule	  of	  reason”:	  	  
	  
Upon	  this	  first,	  and	  in	  one	  sense	  this	  sole,	  rule	  of	  reason,	  that	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  you	  must	  
desire	  to	  learn	  and	  in	  so	  desiring	  not	  be	  satisfied	  with	  what	  you	  already	  incline	  to	  think,	  
there	  follows	  one	  corollary	  which	  itself	  deserves	  to	  be	  inscribed	  upon	  every	  wall	  of	  the	  city	  
of	  philosophy,	  Do	  not	  block	  the	  way	  of	  inquiry.	  (EP	  2:48,	  1898)	  
	  
For	  a	  long	  time	  after	  Peirce’s	  death,	  his	  philosophy	  and	  semiotic	  system	  was	  mostly	  marginalized.	  
The	  same	  was	  true	  of	  his	  formulations	  of	  inquiry	  with	  notable	  exceptions	  like	  N.	  R.	  Hanson.	  In	  the	  
1990s	  Peirce’s	  notion	  of	  inquiry	  started	  to	  attract	  more	  attention.	  Hintikka	  (2014,	  103)	  has	  stated	  
bluntly	  that	  Peirce	  was	  not	  just	  a	  predecessor	  of	  later	  “discoveries”	  but	  his	  ideas	  are	  still	  ahead	  of	  
many	  contemporary	  formulations.	  Peirce’s	  ideas	  transcend	  the	  borders	  of	  standard	  formulations	  
of	  analytic	  philosophy,	  pragmatism,	  critical	  theory,	  phenomenology,	  and	  hermeneutics,	  having	  
elements	  from	  and	  giving	  elements	  to	  different	  approaches.	  	  
	  
Synonyms	  	  
-­‐   Stages	  of	  inquiry;	  Models	  of	  inquiry;	  Methods	  of	  inquiry	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Peircean	  formulations	  of	  inquiry	  
	  
Inquiry	  as	  the	  settlement	  of	  opinion	  
	  
Peirce	  formulated	  a	  conception	  of	  inquiry	  and	  scientific	  method	  in	  his	  classic	  papers	  “The	  Fixation	  
of	  Belief”	  and	  “How	  to	  Make	  Our	  Ideas	  Clear.”	  These	  articles	  were	  meant	  for	  a	  wider	  audience	  and	  
have	  left	  room	  for	  different	  interpretations	  and	  tensions.	  The	  tensions	  concern	  the	  nature	  of	  
Peirce’s	  pragmatism	  (to	  what	  extent	  it	  is	  practically	  oriented),	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  realism	  (to	  what	  
extent	  “real”	  is	  defined	  as	  independent	  or	  dependent	  on	  human	  practices).	  	  
	  
Peirce	  presents	  inquiry	  which	  is	  in	  between	  the	  dynamics	  provided	  by	  “doubt”	  and	  “belief.”	  	  	  
	  
The	  irritation	  of	  doubt	  causes	  a	  struggle	  to	  attain	  a	  state	  of	  belief.	  I	  shall	  term	  this	  struggle	  
inquiry,	  though	  it	  must	  be	  admitted	  that	  this	  is	  sometimes	  not	  a	  very	  apt	  designation	  …	  With	  
the	  doubt	  …	  the	  struggle	  begins,	  and	  with	  the	  cessation	  of	  doubt	  it	  ends.	  Hence,	  the	  sole	  
object	  of	  inquiry	  is	  the	  settlement	  of	  opinion.	  (EP	  1:114-­‐5,	  1877)	  
	  
Peirce	  interprets	  beliefs	  as	  closely	  related	  to	  habitual	  actions,	  and	  some	  kind	  of	  dispositions	  to	  act.	  
Beliefs	  show	  in,	  and	  shape,	  our	  actions.	  Doubt	  is	  “an	  uneasy	  and	  dissatisfied	  state	  from	  which	  we	  
struggle	  to	  free	  ourselves”	  (ibid.	  114).	  For	  inquiry,	  both	  doubt	  and	  belief	  are	  needed.	  The	  aim	  is	  
the	  settlement	  of	  beliefs	  but	  doubts	  are	  the	  stimulus	  for	  the	  inquiry.	  	  
	  
In	  “The	  Fixation	  of	  Belief”	  Peirce	  complements	  his	  model	  of	  inquiry	  with	  four	  methods	  of	  fixing	  
beliefs,	  namely	  1)	  “the	  method	  of	  tenacity,”	  2)	  “the	  method	  of	  authority,”	  3)	  “the	  a	  priori	  
method,”	  and	  4)	  “the	  scientific	  method.”	  Peirce	  asks	  that	  if	  the	  aim	  of	  inquiry	  is	  the	  settlement	  of	  
opinion,	  why	  should	  one	  not	  just	  stick	  to	  some	  opinion?	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  many	  people	  
do.	  People	  often	  dislike	  an	  undecided	  state	  of	  mind,	  and	  hence	  they	  cling	  to	  certain	  views,	  and	  
avoid	  different	  kinds	  of	  opinion.	  This	  “method	  of	  tenacity”	  works	  as	  such	  but	  the	  “social	  impulse”	  
is	  against	  it.	  People	  notice	  that	  others	  think	  differently.	  “The	  method	  of	  authority”	  can,	  to	  a	  
certain	  extent,	  solve	  this	  problem.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  power	  of	  institutions.	  People	  are	  kept	  in	  
ignorance	  and/or	  they	  are	  forced	  to	  follow	  certain	  doctrines.	  This	  method	  has	  been	  used	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throughout	  history,	  especially	  by	  theological	  and	  political	  organizations.	  It	  is	  found	  “[w]herever	  
there	  is	  an	  aristocracy,	  or	  a	  guild,	  or	  any	  association	  of	  a	  class	  of	  men	  whose	  interests	  depend	  or	  
are	  supposed	  to	  depend	  on	  certain	  propositions”	  (ibid.,	  117).	  This	  is	  not	  a	  lasting	  solution	  to	  the	  
settlement	  of	  opinions	  either.	  Some	  individuals	  “see	  that	  men	  in	  other	  countries	  and	  in	  other	  ages	  
have	  held	  to	  very	  different	  doctrines”	  (ibid.,	  118).	  The	  “a	  priori	  method”	  is	  based	  on	  people	  
regarding	  things	  from	  different	  angles,	  and	  then	  formulating	  beliefs	  agreeable	  to	  reason.	  An	  
example	  is	  the	  history	  of	  metaphysical	  philosophy	  which	  has	  “not	  usually	  rested	  upon	  any	  
observed	  facts,	  at	  least	  not	  in	  any	  great	  degree”	  (ibid.,	  118-­‐9).	  It	  makes	  beliefs	  more	  or	  less	  a	  
matter	  of	  taste	  or	  fashion.	  Peirce’s	  example	  is	  the	  doctrine	  that	  human	  beings	  only	  act	  selfishly.	  
“This	  rests	  on	  no	  fact	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  it	  has	  had	  a	  wide	  acceptance	  as	  being	  the	  only	  reasonable	  
theory”	  (ibid.,	  119).	  What	  Peirce	  calls	  the	  “scientific	  method”	  aims	  at	  improving	  on	  this.	  Peirce	  
does	  not	  argue	  for	  some	  specific	  scientific	  method	  (like	  inductivism	  or	  deductivism),	  or	  say	  that	  
science	  always	  follows	  it.	  Instead,	  he	  explicates	  the	  general	  characteristics	  of	  fixing	  beliefs	  caused	  
“by	  nothing	  human,	  but	  by	  some	  external	  permanency”	  (ibid.,	  120).	  This	  must	  be	  something	  that	  
affects	  everyone,	  not	  just	  some	  individuals	  (otherwise	  a	  social	  impulse	  is	  again	  against	  it).	  Peirce	  
ends	  up	  having	  a	  conception	  of	  truth	  and	  reality	  sound	  like	  a	  strong	  version	  of	  realism:	  “The	  
opinion	  which	  is	  fated	  to	  be	  ultimately	  agreed	  to	  by	  all	  who	  investigate,	  is	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  the	  
truth,	  and	  the	  object	  represented	  in	  this	  opinion	  is	  the	  real”	  (EP	  1:139;	  1878).	  Peirce’s	  conception	  
of	  the	  scientific	  method	  is	  not,	  however,	  based	  just	  on	  external	  permanency	  (or	  on	  permanent	  
“facts”	  like	  in	  the	  traditional	  conception	  of	  school	  learning)	  but	  on	  the	  strong	  “social	  impulse”	  to	  
doubt	  existing	  beliefs	  if	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so.	  In	  his	  later	  life	  Peirce	  emphasized	  a	  
version	  of	  scholastic	  realism,	  maintaining	  that	  besides	  real	  generalities,	  there	  are	  also	  real	  
“vagues”	  and	  real	  possibilities	  (EP	  2:354,	  1905).	  It	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  inquiry	  to	  show	  what	  would	  be	  
a	  conclusion	  on	  a	  certain	  issue	  if	  the	  investigation	  is	  carried	  sufficiently	  far.	  
	  
In	  these	  papers	  Peirce	  presented	  his	  famous	  maxim	  of	  pragmatism,	  which	  was	  originally	  a	  method	  
for	  the	  analysis	  of	  concepts	  and	  their	  meanings:	  
	  
Consider	  what	  effects,	  that	  might	  conceivably	  have	  practical	  bearings,	  we	  conceive	  the	  object	  
of	  our	  conception	  to	  have.	  Then,	  our	  conception	  of	  these	  effects	  is	  the	  whole	  of	  our	  
conception	  of	  the	  object.	  (EP	  1:132,	  1878)	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A	  1903	  formulation	  is	  more	  illustrative	  and	  metaphorical:	  
The	  elements	  of	  every	  concept	  enter	  into	  logical	  thought	  at	  the	  gate	  of	  perception	  and	  make	  
their	  exit	  at	  the	  gate	  of	  purposive	  action;	  and	  whatever	  cannot	  show	  its	  passports	  at	  both	  
those	  two	  gates	  is	  to	  be	  arrested	  as	  unauthorized	  by	  reason.	  (EP	  2:241,	  1903)	  	  
	  
The	  maxim	  has	  had	  a	  significant	  influence	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  pragmatism	  (EP	  2:334,	  1905),	  
emphasizing	  the	  close	  connection	  and	  interaction	  of	  conceptions	  with	  practical	  effects	  and	  
purposive	  action.	  	  Inquiry	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  practical	  human	  context.	  	  
	  
Three	  stages	  of	  inquiry	  
	  
Peirce’s	  conception	  of	  inquiry	  can	  also	  be	  described	  by	  using	  his	  distinction	  between	  three	  main	  
forms	  of	  inference,	  that	  is,	  abduction,	  induction,	  and	  deduction.	  In	  his	  earlier	  works	  they	  were	  
treated	  as	  separate	  forms	  of	  reasoning.	  Later,	  he	  emphasized	  them	  methodologically	  as	  three	  
stages	  of	  inquiry	  (EP	  2:75-­‐114,	  1901;	  EP	  2:440-­‐442,	  1908):	  “Every	  inquiry	  whatsoever	  takes	  its	  rise	  
in	  the	  observation,	  …	  of	  some	  surprising	  phenomenon,	  some	  experience	  which	  either	  disappoints	  
an	  expectation,	  or	  breaks	  in	  upon	  some	  habit	  of	  expectation	  …”	  (EP	  2:440-­‐1).	  This	  instigates	  a	  
search	  for	  a	  conjecture,	  or	  a	  possible	  explanation	  which	  would	  resolve	  the	  anomaly.	  The	  search	  
and	  preliminary	  adoption	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  is	  abductive.	  If	  the	  hypothesis	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  facts	  and	  
resolves	  surprises	  the	  inquirer	  is	  inclined	  to	  believe	  it.	  But	  there	  are	  always	  (at	  least	  in	  principle)	  a	  
multitude	  of	  hypotheses	  that	  could	  explain	  the	  facts.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  test	  the	  suggested	  solution	  
and	  see	  if	  it	  works	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  experience	  that	  started	  the	  inquiry.	  At	  the	  second	  stage,	  
experiential	  consequences	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  hypothesis	  deductively,	  that	  is,	  what	  would	  follow	  
if	  the	  hypothesis	  were	  true.	  In	  the	  third	  stage,	  characteristically	  inductive,	  it	  is	  ascertained	  by	  using	  
actual	  tests	  that	  “the	  hypothesis	  is	  sensibly	  correct,	  or	  requires	  some	  inessential	  modification,	  or	  
must	  be	  entirely	  rejected”	  (ibid.,	  442).	  
	  
Logic	  as	  semiotics	  
	  
Peirce’s	  notion	  of	  inquiry	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  his	  broad	  notion	  of	  logic.	  Peirce	  developed	  
logic	  as	  a	  formal	  and	  mathematical	  research	  field.	  But	  in	  its	  broadest	  sense,	  logic	  was	  for	  him	  a	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synonym	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  signs	  in	  general	  (CP	  2.227,	  c.	  1897;	  see	  ‘Logic’	  in	  Bergman	  and	  Paavola,	  
2017).	  	  
	  
Peirce’s	  famous	  theory	  of	  signs	  was	  triadic,	  that	  is,	  it	  had	  three	  main	  elements:	  a	  sign	  itself,	  an	  
object	  for	  which	  it	  stands	  for,	  and	  an	  interpretant	  which	  is	  another	  representation	  determined	  by	  
the	  sign.	  Besides	  critic	  (emphasizing	  the	  validity	  of	  arguments),	  logic	  covers	  grammar	  (general	  
theory	  of	  signs),	  and	  methodeutic,	  or	  rhetoric	  (on	  conducting	  inquiry	  or	  on	  transmission	  of	  
meanings).	  It	  covers	  “logica	  docens”,	  that	  is,	  scientific	  studies	  of	  arguments,	  and	  “logica	  utens”	  
meaning	  a	  practical	  art	  of	  using	  arguments.	  According	  to	  Peirce’s	  system,	  logic	  is	  based	  on	  other	  
normative	  sciences,	  namely	  on	  ethics	  and	  esthetics.	  Besides	  symbols,	  logic	  also	  covers	  indices	  and	  
icons.	  Indices	  bring	  forth	  physical	  connections	  between	  signs	  and	  objects.	  Icons	  highlight	  visual	  
and	  perceptual	  elements	  in	  human	  thought	  and	  reasoning.	  Imagination	  and	  “musement”	  are	  a	  
basis	  for	  human	  creativity.	  Besides	  abductive	  reasoning,	  Peirce	  defined	  analogies	  and	  metaphors	  
as	  central	  elements	  of	  human	  thought.	  He	  emphasized	  the	  dialogic	  nature	  of	  sign	  processes;	  
moreover,	  our	  own	  thinking	  is	  a	  dialogue	  within	  ourselves	  (EP	  2:402,	  1907).	  He	  had	  modern	  
conceptions	  like	  “common	  ground,”	  pointing	  out	  that	  two	  speakers	  must	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  
common	  experience	  or	  mutual	  knowledge	  in	  order	  to	  start	  understanding	  each	  other	  at	  all.	  Peirce	  
also	  formulated	  a	  semiotic	  theory	  of	  mind	  which	  was	  similar	  to	  modern	  ideas	  of	  distributed	  
cognition.	  Mind	  operates	  not	  just	  with	  signs	  in	  “our	  heads”	  but	  uses	  all	  kinds	  of	  “external	  signs”:	  
“In	  my	  opinion	  it	  is	  much	  more	  true	  that	  the	  thoughts	  of	  a	  living	  writer	  are	  in	  any	  printed	  copy	  of	  
his	  book	  than	  that	  they	  are	  in	  his	  brain”	  (CP	  7.364,	  c.	  1902).	  
	  
Broader	  notions	  of	  a	  Peircean	  model	  of	  inquiry	  
	  
Peirce’s	  conception	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  broader	  doctrine	  of	  research	  and	  inquiry	  




Fallibilism	  is	  “the	  doctrine	  that	  our	  knowledge	  is	  never	  absolute	  but	  always	  swims,	  as	  it	  were,	  in	  a	  
continuum	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  of	  indeterminacy”	  (CP	  1.171,	  c.	  1897).	  This	  doctrine	  is	  based	  on	  
Peirce’s	  metaphysics	  of	  growth	  and	  development,	  and	  also	  on	  human	  experience	  of	  the	  history	  of	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sciences.	  Many	  things	  which	  have	  been	  treated	  as	  infallible	  have	  turned	  out	  not	  to	  be	  certain	  or	  as	  
exact	  as	  previously	  thought:	  “Absolute	  infallibility	  may	  belong	  to	  the	  pope	  and	  the	  ecumenical	  
councils”	  (CP	  2.75,	  1902)	  but	  it	  is	  not	  applicable	  in	  scientific	  research.	  Peirce	  was,	  however,	  also	  
against	  skepticism,	  opposing	  “paper	  doubt.”	  Just	  putting	  a	  proposition	  into	  the	  interrogative	  form	  




In	  his	  later	  life	  Peirce	  formulated	  a	  doctrine	  of	  “critical	  common-­‐sensism”	  (see	  EP	  2:	  346-­‐353,	  
1905;	  ‘Critical	  Common-­‐Sensism’	  in	  Bergman	  and	  Paavola,	  2017).	  It	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  the	  philosophy	  
of	  common	  sense	  according	  to	  which	  there	  are	  some	  indubitable	  propositions	  and	  inferences.	  It	  
highlights,	  however,	  that	  indubitable	  beliefs	  are	  vague	  and	  apply	  mostly	  to	  quite	  primitive	  things	  
(one	  example	  is	  that	  no	  sane	  human	  being	  doubts	  that	  fire	  would	  burn	  one’s	  fingers	  –	  EP	  2:433,	  
1907).	  Critical	  common-­‐sensism	  has	  a	  high	  esteem	  for	  living	  doubt,	  especially	  on	  matters	  which	  
are	  beyond	  instinctual	  experience.	  Things	  which	  are	  treated	  as	  indubitable	  can	  change.	  Peirce’s	  
ideas	  of	  inquiry	  and	  philosophy	  provide	  a	  continuum	  starting	  with	  common	  sense	  beliefs,	  which	  
might	  be	  practically	  indubitable	  but	  historically	  changing,	  and	  might	  move	  towards	  more	  
consciously	  and	  scientifically	  formulated	  propositions.	  
	  
Theories	  of	  growth	  and	  evolution	  
	  
Peirce	  formulated	  conceptions	  of	  evolution	  and	  growth	  in	  a	  series	  of	  Monist	  articles	  in	  the	  early	  
1890s	  (EP	  2:285-­‐371,	  1891-­‐3).	  Peirce	  called	  the	  conception	  according	  to	  which	  development	  
happens	  by	  mechanical	  necessity,	  anancastic	  evolution.	  Tychastic	  evolution	  or	  tychism	  is	  the	  
doctrine	  that	  absolute	  chance	  guides	  evolution	  and	  growth.	  Peirce	  himself	  favored	  agapastic	  
evolution	  or	  agapasm,	  where	  some	  kind	  of	  purpose	  for	  or	  attraction	  to	  an	  idea	  leads	  evolution.	  
Peirce’s	  formulations	  have	  been	  criticized	  as	  wild	  metaphysical	  speculations.	  They,	  however,	  
describe	  processes	  of	  development	  where	  chance	  and	  purpose,	  or	  necessity	  and	  freedom,	  are	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Epistemologies	  of	  mediation	  
	  
Peirce	  did	  not	  name	  his	  epistemology	  explicitly.	  He	  depicts	  a	  dynamic	  approach	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  
knowledge	  where	  empiricism	  and	  rationalism	  are	  merged	  together.	  It	  has	  elements	  from	  his	  anti-­‐
Cartesianism,	  realism,	  pragmaticism,	  and	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  theory	  of	  signs.	  He	  criticized	  
Cartesianism	  and	  a	  rationalistic	  a	  priori	  method	  for	  not	  taking	  empirical	  observations	  and	  
multiplicity	  of	  conceptions	  into	  account.	  But	  his	  epistemology	  is	  not	  traditional	  empiricism	  either.	  
Observations	  are	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  inquiry	  but	  are	  abductively	  rather	  than	  inductively	  based	  on	  
an	  interaction	  between	  observations	  and	  conceptions	  from	  the	  start.	  He	  criticized	  nominalism	  as	  a	  
doctrine	  according	  to	  which	  general	  elements	  are	  produced	  by	  human	  cognition	  merely	  as	  a	  
convenience	  for	  understanding	  (see	  CP	  4.1,	  1898;	  ‘Nominalism’	  in	  Bergman	  &	  Paavola	  2017).	  He	  
supported	  scholastic	  realism	  as	  an	  alternative.	  In	  his	  semiotic	  theory,	  signs	  do	  not	  just	  refer	  to	  
other	  signs	  but	  to	  objects	  and	  realities.	  His	  epistemology	  builds	  on	  the	  dynamic	  idea	  of	  mediation	  
with	  elements	  from	  different	  categories,	  that	  is,	  Firstnesses	  (qualities,	  spontaneity,	  feeling,	  
possibilities),	  Secondnesses	  (actualities,	  brute	  reaction,	  indices),	  and	  Thirdnesses	  (sign	  processes,	  
representation,	  mediation).	  Peirce	  depicts	  an	  epistemology	  which	  is	  a	  future-­‐oriented,	  historically	  
developing,	  social	  process	  starting	  with	  living	  doubt,	  and	  grounded	  on	  emerging	  interpretations	  of	  
reality	  with	  practical	  effects	  (a	  concise	  description	  of	  Peirce’s	  method	  of	  inquiry	  is	  provided	  in	  
Strand,	  2005).	  	  	  	  
	  
Peircean	  inquiry	  and	  educational	  philosophy	  
	  
Three	  special	  issues	  are	  dedicated	  to	  Peirce	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  educational	  philosophy	  (see	  
Semetsky,	  2005;	  Colapietro	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Strand,	  2013).	  Peirce	  “posited	  logic	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  dynamic	  
inquiry	  irreducible	  to	  some	  indubitable	  and	  certain	  knowledge”	  (Semetsky,	  2005,	  153).	  It	  is	  also	  
stated	  that	  Peirce’s	  views	  come	  close	  to	  the	  Herbartian	  conception	  of	  Bildung	  aiming	  at	  nurturing	  
critical	  thinkers.	  Peirce	  promotes	  active	  learning	  in	  line	  with	  Dewey’s	  experiential	  learning.	  Even	  if	  
Peirce	  neglects	  the	  topic	  of	  gender,	  his	  fallibilism	  is	  a	  promising	  ally	  for	  feminism	  when	  it	  removes	  
the	  assumptions	  of	  absolutism,	  universality,	  and	  neutrality.	  Peirce’s	  semiotic	  theory	  of	  learning	  
has	  been	  analyzed,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  dialogic	  conception	  of	  sign	  processes,	  and	  Peirce’s	  rhetorics	  
provide	  dynamic	  means	  of	  understanding	  the	  meaning	  of	  communication.	  Imagination,	  
observation,	  reasoning	  skills,	  and	  esthetic	  outlook	  are	  in	  fact	  important	  themes	  in	  Peircean	  inquiry	  
	   8	  
and	  learning.	  The	  Peircean	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  also	  provides	  a	  means	  for	  analyzing	  old	  paradoxes	  
about	  learning	  and	  inquiry,	  like	  the	  classic	  Meno	  paradox.	  The	  themes	  of	  growth	  and	  self	  can	  also	  
be	  analyzed	  using	  Peirce’s	  conceptions,	  and	  another	  	  interesting	  theme	  is	  Peirce’s	  realism	  and	  
critical	  common-­‐sensism.	  
	  	  
Peirce’s	  models	  of	  inquiry	  have	  been	  used	  surprisingly	  rarely	  in	  empirical	  educational	  research.	  
Neither	  have	  they	  provided	  clear-­‐cut	  pedagogical	  models	  for	  inquiry	  learning.	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  
has	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  influenced,	  however,	  concurrent	  inquiry	  learning	  models,	  such	  as	  1)	  
Bereiter’s	  (2002)	  knowledge	  building	  approach	  guiding	  learning	  communities	  to	  assume	  collective	  
responsibility	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  knowledge,	  2)	  Hakkarainen	  and	  colleagues’	  (2004)	  
progressive	  inquiry	  model	  emphasizing	  cyclic	  collaborative	  inquiry	  processes	  guided	  by	  learners	  
questions	  and	  working	  theories,	  and	  3)	  the	  trialogical	  learning	  model	  addressing	  object-­‐oriented	  
inquiry	  processes	  in	  interaction	  between	  educational	  and	  other	  communities	  (Paavola	  and	  
Hakkarainen,	  2005).	  
	  
These	  inquiry	  models	  share	  characteristics	  with	  Peirce’s	  pragmatist	  theory	  of	  inquiry	  even	  when	  
their	  interlinkages	  often	  remain	  implicit.	  Firstly,	  engaging	  learners	  in	  posing	  their	  own	  explanation-­‐
seeking	  questions	  and	  working	  theories	  through	  iterative	  cycles	  of	  inquiry	  is	  highlighted.	  In	  
accordance	  with	  abduction,	  inquiry	  is	  guided	  by	  conjectures	  based	  on	  conceptual	  and	  practical	  
background	  knowledge.	  Secondly,	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  dynamic	  processes	  of	  developing	  
knowledge	  objects	  that	  are	  materially	  embodied.	  Thirdly,	  rather	  than	  taking	  place	  merely	  within	  
the	  mind,	  inquiry	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  external	  tools,	  including	  signs	  and	  conceptual	  artifacts.	  
Fourthly,	  interrelations	  between	  thinking	  and	  acting	  are	  highlighted	  as	  well	  as	  integration	  
between	  levels	  of	  knowing	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  traditional	  science	  education,	  which	  overemphasizes	  
conceptual	  and	  rational	  aspects	  of	  inquiry.	  Inquiry-­‐based	  practices	  engage	  learners	  not	  only	  with	  
symbolic	  generalizations	  (Thirdnesses)	  but	  with	  qualities	  of	  feeling	  (Firstnesses)	  to	  be	  explored	  
through	  practical	  experimentation	  (Secondnesses).	  Transformations	  between	  these	  levels	  
facilitate	  learning	  and	  development.	  Fifthly,	  inquiry-­‐based	  practices	  examine	  the	  meaning	  of	  
concepts	  in	  relation	  to	  practical	  consequences.	  Learners	  are	  guided	  to	  function	  as	  a	  community,	  
and	  this	  entails	  self-­‐organizing	  processes	  that	  gradually	  raise	  epistemic	  standards	  of	  interpretation	  
within	  learners.	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  provides	  several	  means	  for	  highlighting	  the	  community	  of	  
inquiry	  foregrounded	  through	  the	  emergence	  of	  modern	  collaborative	  technologies.	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